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Abstract
This paper seeks to recover the function of universal history, which was to place particulars into
relation with universals. By the 20th century universal history was largely discredited because of
an idealism that served to lend epistemic coherence to the overwhelming complexity arising from
universal history’s comprehensive scope. Idealism also attempted to account for history’s being
“open”—for the human ability to transcend circumstance. The paper attempts to recover these
virtues without the idealism by defining universal history not by its scope but rather as a scientific
method that provides an understanding of any kind of historical process, be it physical, biological
or human. While this method is not new, it is in need of a development that offers a more robust
historiography and warrant as a liberating historical consciousness. The first section constructs an
ontology of process by defining matter as ontic probabilities rather than as closed entities. This is
lent warrant in the next section through an appeal to contemporary physical science. The resulting
conceptual frame and method is applied to the physical domain of existents, to the biological do-
main of social being and finally to the human domain of species being. It is then used to account
for the emergence of human history’s initial stage—the Archaic Socio-Economic Formation and
for history’ stadial trajectory—its alternation of evolution and revolution.
Keywords— universal history, species being, emergence, historical materialism, socio-economic
formation, post-humanism, Marxism, ontic probability
1 Introduction
Its objective idealism is why traditional universal history lost credibility; today, it must instead
be scientific and materialist. The aim will be to elaborate the method that supports this more
scientific kind of historiography. It is here named a constructive abstraction because this term
is least presumptive and because the method enlarges upon observed phenomena by engaging
unobservables.
The word “universal” conventionally refers to what is true at all times and places. However, any
such claim is inherently idealist. So it will here instead refer to a method that conveys an under-
standing of any kind of historical process, be it physical, biological or human. Argued will be that
this necessarily makes universal history materialist rather than idealist, and that as a consequence
explanatory success appeals to constructive action rather than intelligibility (Munshi 1978). This
is unconventional enough to require idealist history first be defined to serve as its counter.
An example of traditional idealist universal history is Bishop Bossuet’s Discours sur l’histoire
universelle (1681). In a fundamental way it defines the shape of universal history in the modern
West. Bossuet’s explicit aim was to see if it is possible to construct a comprehensive history that
conveys the meaning of the particular facts found in all sources, both profane and sacred, in relation
to the universal divine plan. The problem was that by his time comprehensiveness had come
to engage a much larger and more complex world lacking in parochial coherence. This forced
him to shift the source of the world’s coherence from an objective divine plan to the observer’s
subjective perspective. He argued that progress in the “arts of subsistence” (Bossuet 2010, 4–6)
now empowered the individual to adopt what we would call the anthropocentric humanist position
that an explanation of the past is its meaning for a present individual observer (Bossuet 2010,
vi–vii). Thus historiography becomes a cognitive construct that subsumes the data of experience.
In sociological terms the development of private property had come to support a socially con-
structed potency of “ownership” rather than a divinely ordained natural use right (Tierney 2006). It
empowered the individual to be the autonomous measure of the world. This Western ethos is man-
ifest in the adoption of perspectivism in the fine arts (Maiorino 1976) and in Galileo’s reduction
of the world to mathematics (Moran 2012, Chapter 3). The present paper will replace this hu-
manistic anthropocentrism with a posthumanist materialism in which mankind is seen as the most
improbable actualization of natural possibilities rather than independent of material determination.
To warrant humankind’s appropriation of the divinely plan, the mind was reified and lent on-
tological priority over matter. Because of this Cartesianism, historical development appeared to
emerge from a rational weighing of opportunities by the owners of property rather than being the
result of an effort to actualize the world’s possibilities: the coherence of the past emerges as the
outcome of rational choices made by competing empowered individuals (Kant 1963, 14–16 et
passim).
The world is conventionally known through its causal effects on sensory organs or measure-
ment instrumentation. As the result, the relation of things is viewed as causal. The world’s furniture
appears to stand in unequivocally deterministic relations. This makes the world seem rationally co-
herent and predictable. However, causality is an artifact of reduction (Norton 2003). The world in
fact consists of processes that are always open and thus not entirely predictable (Duara 1998). A
Cartesian primacy of mind not only reduces the world to phenomena, but also frees the mind to
invent private understandings and explanations. This humanism lent universal history its charac-
teristically speculative character (as in Schiller 1972).
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Nineteenth-century positivists objected to this unscientific subsumption of fact under ideas.
However, change, as important as it was in the Western ethos, was unintelligible without an objec-
tive idealism to serve as a fulcrum for a transcendence of existents. So they continued to attribute
causal potency to ideal cognitive constructs such as the rational totalities of cultures, civilizations
and societies, which lent warrant to their comparative method (Ghosh 1964). The reduction also
required the construction of irreducible “base elements” that supported a methodological individ-
ualism suited to a world of closed entities. As the result, universal history gave way to a “world
history” arising from the interaction of closed units inferred from observables (Dirlik 2005). This
put history in thrall to existents, to the past, rather than viewed as an emergent process open to the
future. The price paid for ridding universal history of its idealism was that historic consciousness
ceased being, as Lord Acton is supposed to have claimed, the keystone of liberty, a method by
which to transcend circumstance (Aufhebung).
Universal historiography is nevertheless worth salvaging. The reasons are conventional enough.
Put simply, local history cannot be adequately understood independently of the wider world; only
an open historiography that engages real possibilities can make historic consciousness liberating;
given today’s global integration it is necessary to understand the relation of differences in positive
rather than in just the antagonistic terms implied by the causal relation of closed entities.
This salvage effort requires an ontological monism, for universality is incompatible with an
objective idealism that cleaves the world into incommensurate ontic domains. Because biological
and mental life initially arose from matter, one cannot argue they are ontologically independent of
it. However, to accommodate them, it will be argued that the concept “matter” must be redefined
to refer to ontic probabilities. Philosophers may be inclined to appeal instead to ideal modal
possibilities, but the paper’s prioritization of action means it must look to science rather than to
philosophy. It will jettison idealism by reconciling possibility and actuality as merely aspects of
one ontological category, that of ontic probability.
Historiography must recover an understanding of open processes rather than presume a causal
relation of a reified past and the present (Fillion 2014). Scientificity means reaching beyond im-
mediate impressions and subjective meaning to discover how processes actually work. It will
be argued therefore that universal history must employ a universal method rather than pursue a
quixotic universal representation. Being universal, the method should provide an understanding of
any process that is “historical” in the sense that it is the actualization of ontic probabilities.
The price will be a restraint on explanation. A universal historiography engages the physical,
biological and human domains distinguished by behaviors that in principle cannot be explained in
terms of the domain from which they emerged. Life, for example, is a behavior entirely unknown
in the physical domain. As the result, an account of the emergence of a new domain is limited to a
description of the possibilities for it in a prior domain rather than any necessity for it. This is not
sufficient for explanation (Reiner 1993). However, if action rather than cognition is primary, the
novelty of new domains is adequately addressed in material rather than logical terms.
To make processes intelligible, a painful discussion of ontology is unavoidable. The next sec-
tion will argue that historical explanation does not reduce to empirical statements of fact about
phenomena (in the case of natural science, see, for example A. Cross 1991). Historical processes
never reduce entirely to existents, but are always to some extent improbable in reference to them.
Argued will be that the warrant for explanation is not so much cognitive mastery, heuristics or a
ground for further investigation, but its support for constructive action in the world (Nyrup 2015).
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2 An Ontological Break with Folk Science
Before trying to explain the emergence of the physical, biological and human domains, it is neces-
sary to construct with the aid of contemporary physical science a conceptual framework and ontol-
ogy adequate for an understanding (support for effective action in natural world) and explanation
(support for effective action in social world) of processes. Unfortunately this means stepping out
of the comfortable world familiar to us in daily life.
2.1 The effect of cognitive closure
We enter here upon choppy waters. Mal de mer is reduced by distinguishing contemporary science
from the folk science associated with folk psychology (Churchland 1989; Gelman and Legare
2011). Folk psychology can be understood as a biological adaptation for an organism to act upon
sensory information in order to predict outcomes in support of homeostasis—the reproduction of
its life. While undoubtedly useful, this can be problematic because, as we know today, the data
of experience are a function of the observer’s nature and, with a centralized neural system, the
observer’s a priori conceptions (Jantzen, Mayo, and Patton 2015). The egocentric perspective of
folk psychology thus encourages solipsism and imposes a mereology that encloses the self and
reduces what is other to its effects on the self.
Adaptation and innovative action are fundamentally different ways to engage the world. Pre-
diction in support of adaptation is possible to the degree the world is engaged as a determinant
state of affairs inferred from phenomena that can be represented in thought. While the resulting
cognitive construct is a useful tool in a deterministic world, it cannot represent emergent processes
that, it will be argued, can only be engaged through action.
Since prediction is enhanced by a narrowing of scope, traditional European science represented
the world in terms of a point-set typology. At points in an ideal Cartesian space exist sets of
intrinsic properties that exhaustively define an deal entity located there. So the outcome of the
interaction of entities is unequivocally determined by their intrinsic properties. This defines a world
driven by unequivocal necessity, is fundamentally logical and is accessible to rational thought.
Because nothing exists beyond a point except other points, the entity becomes the fundamental
unit of analysis (Wilson 2012; Butterfield 2006). This reduction to intrinsic properties lends the
entity autonomy and enables it to truck and barter freely with other entities.
However, if things are processes they cannot be defined solely in terms of intrinsic properties.
So to reconcile change with essential being, folk science distinguishes persistent properties and
evanescent properties on the basis of a subjective and arbitrary measure of time. The former are
lent the status of being essential in contrast to ephemeral accidentals that do not support explana-
tion because they fail to support prediction. This infers ontology from epistemology and reduces
processes to a sequence of static states (Dieks 2006).
Because of its closure for the sake of intelligibility, the method of early modern European
science represents a “reductive abstraction.” It reduces what is significant to what happens to
persist longer, is spatio-temporally local and thus observable, and acquires meaning through its
relation to ideal totalities or laws. That is, essential properties standing in predictable and thus
necessary relations form persistent sets that are reified to make an independent difference in the
world (Pitkin 1987). While the method of reductive abstraction is practical in daily life, it gives
rise to a host of problems when not in service to an open conception of the world.
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One problem faced by the method of reductive abstraction is that while it supports useful pre-
diction, it makes historical processes unintelligible. We experience a process and know it to be
one, but are unable to subject it to reason or convey it through the language of daily life. Saint
Augustine made this point in relation to time (Confessions, 11.14.17). Neuroscience shows why:
in order for the brain to subject phenomenal information to cognitive processing, the analog in-
puts from sensory organs are temporally segmented into digital action potentials (Kurby and Zacks
2008; Field and Hineline 2008). Instead of seeing historical processes as a dialectic of possibility
and necessity in the present, the mind reifies the “past” as an ideal causal determinant of the present
despite its not existing in the present.
The method of reductive abstraction also introduces an “epistemological gap” between what is
spatio-temporally local and what is not, between observables and what is not observable, between
the self as observer and the observed other and between a phenomenon and Ding an sich. This
makes it impossible to warrant statements of fact without already knowing the nature of their
referents (Chalmers 2006). To the extent scientific realism is defined in terms of the truth value of
statements about theoretical entities, it suffers from the same problem (Sterpetti 2015). This paper
aims to close the epistemological gap by taking action to be fundamental rather than presume
a dichotomy of cognizing entity and observables, for in action agent and object become merely
aspects of a single process.
Yet another difficulty is that there is no reason in folk science to assume that a spatial widening
of the frame to include other entities will remain coherent and thus intelligible unless everything is
viewed an artifact of ideal universals. This is why the force of universal laws is occult (Bigelow,
Ellis, and Pargetter 1988); why laws do not correspond with reality (Cartwright 1983).
Finally, it encourages a representation of the world in terms of systems. Although widely taken
for granted, a systems view is an artifact of unwarranted idealist reifications. A system effect
emerges from simply the causal relation of its constituents (Ladyman and Ross 2007, 3-4, 53-
57). These constituents are taken to be closed observables that are essentially independent of the
observer or other entities. Base elements by definition are self-contained and not reducible; they
are a priori. A systems approach nicely supports prediction, but not constructive action. However
this essentially conservative function is not generally recognized.
However necessary folk psychology is for biological survival and useful in daily life, it offers
neither an understanding nor an explanation of historical processes that transcend circumstances
rather than be unequivocally determined by them. The aim is now to construct an alternative
ontology that supports an understanding of historical processes in terms of contemporary science.
2.2 An ontological break
In physical science all things are processes that occur in a time that ranges from near Planck time
to cosmic time. Even cosmic heat death will not end change absolutely. This universality of
processes implies that things have an inherent tendency to change rather than change being an
artifact of causality. That is, if persistence is never absolute, then change is universal.
The only way to understand matter as a process is to define it right from the start as ontic
probabilities rather than as tangible entities. An ontic probability is an objective propensity for
change that references actualities (as tangible observables will here be called). No doubt defining
matter as dispositions is at odds with folk psychology and common sense, but it will be argued is
entirely compatible with contemporary natural science.
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Lest there be confusion, ontic probabilities are not epistemic probabilities. The latter are “fre-
quentist” in that the probability distribution of past outcomes is calculated after the fact of multiple
runs (Hacking 2001, 189-200). An ontic probability is instead a real single-case propensity for
change in the present (Gillies 2000). Its classic discussion is that of Karl Popper (Popper 1959; for
a review of the literature, see T. Cross 2012).
A problem is that if all matter is inherently in motion, then the concept of transcendence be-
comes orphaned, for there is nothing stable to transcend. In the West transcendence often relies
on the presence of an ideal reification that enables actual matter to be transcendent because what
is ideal is not actual. Here instead motion will not refer to empirical change but to a change in the
value of a “structure.” Structure might be understood as both extrinsic (probability value becoming
maximally probable in reference to its circumstances) and intrinsic (probability values becoming
maximally probable in reference to each other), but there they are the same. This maximal proba-
bility serves to define observable “actualities.” So a change refers to a new set of probability values
becoming maximally probable in place of an old.
When not actual, an ontic probability is unobservable and thus is theoretical. While practicing
scientists generally accept the reality of theoretical entities (Boyd 1991), this “scientific realism”
is usually understood in epistemological terms as a belief that a theoretical concept can be true in
reference to the world. To avoid this epistemological gap appeal is now usually made to the “no-
miracles argument” that unobservables are real because they make an observable difference. This
cannot mean that the only real probabilities are those that have observable effects, for they are the
condition of change itself, not just its outcomes. Here theory will refer to ontic probabilities that
don’t happen to be actual but are nevertheless real. This is familiar enough in quantum mechanics
(for example see Bell 2004).
The data of observation are constructed by sensory organs in accord with their powers and are
made intelligible by a priori conceptions and categories (Robus 2015). As the result, observability
is a poor indicator of what is real. This paper avoids the problem by defining matter as an ontic
probability distribution that has both an observable (maximally probable) and an unobservable
(non-local) aspect. Matter thus defined exhausts the physical, biological and human domains that
emerged with the Big Bang from the perfect vacuum of virtual probabilities; all reality ultimately
originated from virtual probabilities. There is nothing supernatural over and above matter when so
defined. While the behaviors that distinguish these three domains must have been possible in the
vacuum, they are not caused by it. But in a probabilistic world, what is possible must eventually
become actual if circumstances allow.
Understanding a world that engages non-actual ontic probabilities calls for a method that
Bertell Ollman called a “constructive abstraction” (Ollman 2003, chapter 5). That is, a concep-
tion of the world must be constructed from theoretical entities as well as observables. The term
“historical materialism” for this method is more appealing, but it would be presumptuous to use it
in this context. The point to be argued is that the method is based on action informed by theory
rather than simply wedding theoretical entities with observables. Contrary to Ollman’s defining
ontic probability as the propensity for something to cause an event, in the next section this relation
will be reversed. It will be action, a change in probability value, that constructs actualities; action
is a priori to actualities.
Someone might well ask how is it possible to base science on unobservable probabilities? It
will be argued that the method of constructive abstraction discovers unobservable ontic probabil-
ities through action, for they are indexed by the effort needed to produce a change rather than
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inferred from its outcome. It thus differs from a reductive abstraction that passively culls phenom-
enal effects in order to construct ideal categories. However, it is not suggested that constructive
abstraction replace reductive abstraction, for the two methods are interdependent. To be real rather
than virtual, probabilities must reference actualities. Which method is emphasized depends on the
degree to which the goal is adaptation or transcendence, whether the object of study is relatively
closed or open. However, both must always be present.
In short, “matter” will here refer to ontic probability distributions. While non-actual proba-
bilities are undetectable except through action, it will be argued that probabilities that happen to
be maximally probable in relation to circumstance constitute spatio-temporally delimited observ-
able structures. So actualities are the being of a process, while non-actual probabilities are its
becoming (Humphreys 2004). Of course ontic probabilities are not universal in the sense of be-
ing everywhere at all times, but rather in the sense of constituting all matter. Argued will be that
non-actual probabilities simply lack the properties of space and time.
If explanation takes non-local unobservables into account, it runs counter to a historiographic
canon that explanation be framed as a common-sense narrative based on observables (Velleman
2003). Narrative is appealing because it accords with the short-range experience of daily life and
also because a reification of the past as a determinant of the present can provide individual identity
as an empowered agent. So why should common sense submit to a scientific understanding of
processes? The justification for doing so is that it informs innovative action not in thrall to the
past.
2.3 Implications of the break
The method of constructive abstraction represents an “ontological break” that redefines a priori
assumptions to accord with constructive action rather than intelligibility. The paper thus distances
itself on one hand from a reification of structures not anchored by actualities and on the other from
a radical empiricism.
This break has implications quite alien to folk science. For example, every beginning physics
student quickly learns that lab experiments do not turn out as the textbook predicts and so must
learn about standard deviation. This is a mathematical reductive abstraction that discounts the
significance of actual outcomes and instead bases prediction on the ideal construct of their Gaus-
sian mean. While this does support prediction, the reason for deviations in the actual outcomes
in the real world is ignored (Brzechczyn 2009). If these actual outcomes are subsumed under the
Gaussian mean, probabilities bifurcate into accurate description and ideal meaning.
If despite common sense ontic probabilities are taken to be fundamental, then the terms actual-
ity and possibility refer to an extensive property known as their “value.” The value of a probability
conventionally falls somewhere between absolute certainty (a value of one) and absolute impos-
sibility (a value of zero). However both are only hypotheticals, for in the natural world nothing
is absolutely certain or impossible, and actual processes always fall between the two. So a prob-
ability’s value is a measure of the propensity under the circumstances for a non-local probability
value to become actual and acquire spatio-temporal locality. Probability values are extrinsic in that
they are relative to actualities and simply refer to the value in a probability distribution that hap-
pens to be maximally probable under the circumstances. Properties corresponding to this maximal
probability are thus neither intrinsic nor an ideal essence.
Non-actual probabilities will be characterized as “accessible” if their value references what is
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maximally probable in their distribution. It is their propensity for becoming maximally probable
and thus actual under the circumstances rather than for becoming other. This is contrary to common
sense and is admittedly challenging, in part because some aspects have yet to be explained.
“Actualization” will refer to that aspect of action in which an ontic probability value is becom-
ing maximally probable, actual and spatio-temporally local. In folk science, actualities are defined
as observable isolates and so change can only refer to an observable acquiring a new empirical
state rather than as a new probability value that has become maximally probable in relation to its
world. Change here refers to probability values, not to empirical properties.
The reader might suspect that the argument has been logically incoherent because both ontic
probabilities and action were taken to be fundamental. However, this is not the case because the
improbability of non-actual probabilities is not here taken to be an engine of change but only a
measure of how much change can occur. The term “action potential” will here be the measure
of possible change rather than refer to a cause. The next section argues that action takes place
when a propensity to become more probable balances a propensity to become less probable, and
circumstances allow them to be actual.
To anchor this admittedly abstruse discussion, attention now turns to the physical domain.
Each “domain”—here assumed to be the physical, biological and that of humankind—will be dis-
tinguished by a behavior that was inaccessible in the domain from which it emerged. The physical
domain is characterized by physical existence. The existence of actualities gives ontic probabilities
value and thus a propensity for actual existence. Out of cowardice the logical circularity of action
creating its own necessary conditions will not be addressed in regard to the physical domain, but it
will be for the two other domains.
3 The Behavior of the Physical Domain
The perfect vacuum from which physical existents emerged with a Big Bang lacked the actualities
necessary for probabilities to reference and thus acquire value. As the result, probabilities in
the vacuum were only virtual and unable to make physical existence accessible. This makes the
appearance of physical existence difficult to explain.
However, it can be described in mathematical terms as a “symmetry break” (Anderson 1972).
There are two kinds of symmetry break. The kind that accounts for the three cosmic domains
and thus the actualization of improbabilities that are “radical” because independent of persistent
existents is called a “spontaneous symmetry break” (as in Smeenk 2006). The word spontaneous
will here emphasize that access to radically improbable behavior is discovered through the action
characteristic of a new domain rather than necessitated by the old. The other kind of symmetry
break is an “explicit symmetry break,” which is more readily understood and is always taking
place. It is the actualization of ontic probabilities that are accessible because they reference existing
actualities.
The Higgs mechanism by which the actual existence of physical mass spontaneously emerged
will not be discussed here, and physical existence will simply be taken for granted. Attention turns
instead to the mechanism of the explicit symmetry breaks by which novel properties appear within
the physical domain. Explanation begins with the concept of grounding.
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3.1 Grounding
The value of an ontic probability is extrinsic in that it depends on the value of actualities. The
likelihood of rain today depends on meteorological conditions and is not merely an epistemological
artifact. This determination of an ontic probability’s value by actual existents will be referred to
as “grounding.” This term has become the standard way to refer to a non-causal dependence (in
general, see Audi 2012; Clark and Liggins 2012). Grounding is typically defined as one entity
acquiring a property by virtue of another. However, this should not carry any implication that
actualities “cause” probability values, for propensity in itself is not action.
It is generally taken for granted that an actuality grounds because it is a particular (Hörz et al.
1980, 106), here understood to be because it is the specific “maximal probability value” defined
by proximate grounds (ignored is action at a distance where space and time remain unfolded. For
speculation concerning this, see [Maldacena 2016]). This makes its properties spatio-temporally
local and unambivalent. What is not maximally probable and particular offers only a fuzzy ground.
Assumed is that there are distributions of ontic probability values, that each distribution has an
a value that happens to be maximally probable under the circumstances and is its actual value and
this actuality grounds all probability values in the distribution. So a probability distribution is a set
of probability values that have a propensity to acquire the same value as its actual value.
If circumstantial actualities were to be ignored, the propensity of an actuality would simply be
to actualize its own value, its structure in hypothetical isolation. This value will be referred to as
its “self-ground,” its ground of being. However, probabilities never in fact exist in isolation and so
are grounded as well by other actualities. Because no two actualities can be absolutely identical
(the Pauli Exclusion Principle), these exogenous grounds give the distribution a new value so that
it becomes a distribution of vectors. It becomes a set of various propensities for probabilities that
qualitatively differ from the actuality to become maximally probable.
The net weight of the exogenous grounds and self-grounding establishes a distribution’s maxi-
mal probability value and thus the actuality’s actual value. As the result the actuality acquires two
propensities. On one hand an actuality tends to move toward the persistent value of itself in hypo-
thetical isolation. On the other it tends to move toward the net probability defined by its exogenous
grounds, toward becoming what is other than self. So an actuality’s value is both being and be-
coming. It is process because other exogenous grounds keep it from actualizing its self-ground,
while its self-ground keeps it from being merely an artifact of circumstance.
Because the distribution’s accessible states references an actuality’s actual value, an emergent
actuality remains “true to itself” in the sense that its ground establishes the likelihood of quali-
tatively different probabilities in the distribution to become actual. That is, an actuality is not a
persistent structure based on a probable relation of essential properties or base elements, but is
inherently becoming other than self because of the grounding of circumstance. All matter is thus
in motion (a classic discussion is that of Engels 1940).
The physical mechanism of actualization is an unfolding (borrowing a term from string theory)
of the dimensions of space and time (Brown 2014; Balasubramanian 2011). Because two actuali-
ties cannot occupy the same state space, in folk science actualities acquire separation as spatially
local particulars. Another challenge is that an actuality’s becoming cannot be the same value as
that of its being, and so it unfolds the dimension of temporality to separate them. The result is
that particularity gives rise to local time asymmetry despite the symmetry of physical laws (Loew
2016). Admittedly this is speculative, although it does resolve an array of problems.
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The unfolding of spatial and temporal specificity will be referred to as “localization,” the be-
coming of a unique particular that is maximally probable in reference to its endogenous and ex-
ogenous grounds. Localization enables actualities to ground measurement instrumentation and
sensory organs, and so they are called “observables” (Kosso 1988). Because spatiality is a condi-
tion for existence as a unique particular, grounding acquires the property of relative weight that is
a function of proximity. The greater is the proximity, the weightier is its ground.
In short, being and becoming are due to the different sources of grounding, which give rise to
opposite propensities. One propensity is for an actuality to move toward a more probable relation
with its self-ground and the other propensity is to move toward a more probable relation with
actualities other than itself (for example, Konopka, Markopoulou, and Severini 2008). The former
is to become more probable and the latter to become less probable in reference to the actuality’s
present or existent value. This offers a definition of “process.” While it might seem to clash wildly
with folk science, it in fact merely enlarges upon it.
3.2 The primacy of action
The Big Bang constructed existents from virtual probabilities, and so the action of becoming is
primary; actuality, local being, existence and identity is secondary (Dorato 2006). Given this, a
mere description of observables in isolation makes being and becoming logically contradictory: it
defines being as the effect of the “past,” reified so as to acquire causal efficacy in the present; a
reified becoming is attributed to a future of ideal possibilities that enable innovative action in the
present. Clearly processes cannot be understood in folk terms.
Here instead the “past” simply refers to an actuality’s self-ground that slows its rate of becom-
ing. The open “future” will here refer to presently accessible but unactualized probability values
that reference what is actual (Capek 1981). The past and future are thus merely aspects of a process
that, as will be seen, constructs its own time and space.
When a probability value more probable than an actuality is actualized, it is conventionally
known as “dissipation.” Here it means that a non-actual probability more probable than the existing
actuality is becoming become maximally probable. If a value less probable than an actuality is
becoming actual and thus maximally probable in reference to existents, it will here serve to define
“emergence.”
There are two kinds of emergence (Bedau and Humphreys 2008). What is known as weak
emergence is a description of novel properties that predictably arise from a causal interaction of
actualities. The observed correlation of base and emergent actualities is generalized to support pre-
diction. A strong emergence on the other hand refers to novel properties that can not be predicted
from knowledge of the base actualities although dependent on them.
Because these concepts are epistemological, different ones will be used. A weak emergence
will be called a “regular emergence” to indicate that novelties will not be viewed as resulting from
a causal relation of existent actualities but as the actualization of accessible probability values that
existent grounds make maximally probable. It is called regular because the probability value of
emergents is determined by existents—by the folk notion of “past.” Strong emergence on the other
hand will be called a “radical emergence” because it is independent of existents and is grounded
instead by artifacts of present action. This kind of emergence will be dealt with at a later point.
Folk science sees dissipation as the engine of emergence because memory allows a comparison
of past and present observable states. The future is unobservable and so, without an appeal to ideal
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forces, emergence lacks explanation. In folk science the actuality having a relatively weightier
self-ground is assigned the function of the “agent,” and the one with the lesser self-ground has the
function of “object.” In this paper these are viewed as one-sided reifications of a process.
Regular emergence actualizes those accessible probability values that are least improbable.
However, if a new ground comes into play, it alters a probability distribution so that what is now
actualized becomes in part a function of the new ground. Now, this is admittedly a gross simplifi-
cation, for in fact actualities are complexities with a host of properties. So a new ground’s effect
on what is actualized is highly variable and depends on the specific weights and qualities of all
grounds. However, the aim here is not to explain particular situations, but a method.
Bringing in unobservable ontic probabilities to support explanation does not invite empty spec-
ulation, for it will be shown that non-actual probability values are subject to “discovery.” A change
in probability value in one direction must balance an equal and opposite change of value in the
opposite direction, and the value of non-actual probabilities are discovered through the observable
dissipation that balances their actualization.
An example is obviously needed. Of much interest in robotics is the relation of the haptic
sense of touch coupled with muscular effort. The propensity of a rubber ball for being squeezed, its
probability distribution, is an unobservable that is discovered as the ball is actually being squeezed.
The values are discovered through the effort required to actualize them. When pressure on the ball
is released, the probable relation of its molecules is no longer outweighed by an external dissipation
and so reasserts itself.
An implication is that the test of a hypothesis regarding an emergent or historical process is not
whether it generates testable predictions based on inferences from phenomena, but whether theory
based on the discovery of non-actual probabilities makes constructive action possible.
3.3 Action as a contradiction
In folk science, action typically refers to a change in an actuality’s observable state. However the
argument has been that this is one-sided, and action cannot be understood as if the actuality were
in isolation, such as a classic thermodynamic system. Instead, explaining action requires starting
with a basic principle of the physical domain: ontological monism’s immunity to miracles. What is
fundamental in the physical domain cannot be created or destroyed. This is known as the “principle
of conservation” (Earman 2004), and on it existence depends (Engels 1940, 37).
Conservation in the physical domain is usually discussed in terms of energy-mass. That is,
while energy-mass can be transferred and transformed, it cannot be created or destroyed. One
reason to see ontic probabilities as fundamental rather than energy-mass is that the latter probably
implies closed units and thus a mechanistic explanation blind to emergence. Also, there is a host
of processes in the physical, biological and human domains that must respect the laws of physics
but do not reduce to physical properties. Conservation here refers to the value of actual ontic
probabilities, for they alone ground.
Assuming this substitution in the conservation principle of ontic probability for energy-mass to
be legitimate, actualities in the physical domain that participate in a conservation of net probability
value represent a “symmetry group.” The net sum of a group’s actual probability values must
conserve the value it inherited from its parent group (Martin, 2003b, 30-36). The symmetry group
is not mereological, for it is not a container of actualities but merely the sum of their values.
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Taking some liberties with convention, the symmetry of a group refers to a situation in which
actual values are maximally probable in reference to grounding actualities. An explicit symmetry
break results from the introduction of a new exogenous ground that changes what is maximally
probable. However, this cannot violate the principle of conservation. As a new probability value
becomes actual, there must be an equal and opposite change of a value in the group so that its
net value is conserved. If the new ground brings a propensity to dissipate, it must be balanced
by an emergence. The new ground does not cause novelty, but merely enables it by breaking the
group’s symmetry. Action is here not the effect of an empowered agent, but the interdependence
of emergent and dissipative propensities; you can’t have one without the other in equal degree.
This begs for an example. A conventional one is a hypothetical pencil perfectly balanced on
its point. It lacks orientation because the pencil’s actual ground makes all possible orientations
equally accessible. Now introduce a little puff of air that makes the probability of orientations
asymmetrical. One orientation becomes more probable than the others, but this is not the cause of
the pencil’s actualization of orientation. It is rather the interdependence of the propensities for the
emergence of orientation and the dissipation of gravity. The latter is not an independent engine of
change but occurs because of the interdependence of two opposite action potentials.
While a causal explanation appears simpler, it is in fact profoundly more complicated. If the
puff of air is seen in causal terms, it is an external force that begs for explanation, and this leads
to infinite regress. The result is that in the absence of objective ideal forces, satisfactory causal
explanations can only be short-range. Action is viewed instead as the unity of equal and opposite
propensities. It is not change, but stability that calls for explanation.
Because symmetry is a mathematical concept specific to the physical domain, a more general
term will be used instead, that of “contradiction” (Marquit 1988). Unfortunately this word is am-
bivalent (Marquit 2011). It has been defined as a logical contradiction resulting from cognitive
closure, as a Hegelian subject-object dialectic or in folk science as incompatible empirical trajec-
tories. Here it will simply refer to equal and opposite changes in the probability values of the
actualities in a symmetry group that conserve its net probability value. To avoid confusion, when
it comes to a logical contradiction it will be specified as such.
Mutual grounding gives actualities a propensity to move toward their net conserved value and
form a persistent structure. However, net value is also conserved if the values of the actualities
move equally away from the conserved value. The mechanisms for these two kinds of regular
action, for contradictions to become respectively “shallow” or to “deepen,” will be discussed next.
The case of radical action will be put off until biological domain.
3.4 The immediate and mediated locking of actualities
In folk science, action is a change in the properties of observables over time, but it is seen here
instead as a contradiction, as an interdependence of equal and opposite change in actual probability
values that conserves existing value. This is the case whether those probability values approach
each other or diverge. This interdependence will be referred to as a “lock.” A lock in which
actualities move toward their net value will be named an “immediate lock,” while action in which
they move away from it a “mediated lock.”
An example of immediate locking is a voltmeter. When not connected to a circuit its needle
points to zero because that position is mechanically most probable. However, when connected to
a circuit’s improbable voltage, the needle moves to the new position that has become maximally
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probable because of the new ground of circuit voltage. The more improbable the voltage, the more
improbable is the needle’s position in relation to its self-ground. The voltage and needle are locked
even though they have no empirical relation. Of course the joint improbability of the needle’s
position and circuit voltage it must balance a dissipation in their environment. This is a drain on
the voltage of the circuit being measured. Because this affects the reading, digital voltmeters with
a reduced self-ground have generally replaced analog meters.
Whether action is a convergence or a divergence of probability values, a net emergence of value
balances a net dissipation of value. Short of a convergence becoming maximally probable and form
a structure, the lock of these opposite propensities is a contradiction. While convergent values
spontaneously move toward the probable relation of their self-grounds, divergent values depend on
a mediating structure. This mediation is given a variety of names such as diode, catalyst, barrier,
surfactant, tool and wall, but here the generic and familiar term “interface” will be used.
The interface supports a divergence of probability values, a “deepening” contradiction, because
of its asymmetric structure or dual sets of properties. One face or set of properties is immediately
locked with the emergent actuality and the other face or set of properties is immediately locked
with the dissipating actuality. It establishes a zero-sum relation of their change in probability on
the condition that its self-ground is weightier than the probabilities it grounds.
An example of an interface with different sets of properties that support a contradiction is a
tool such as a screw driver. Like the pivot of a teeter board, the tool itself does no work, and its
self-ground conserves its structure despite wear and tear. One end of the screw driver immediately
locks with the hand, while the other immediately locks with the screw. The dissipative effort
turning the screwdriver balances the screw’s improbable insertion. Anthropocentrism encourages
thinking that it is a person’s intent and effort that cause insertion, but in naturalistic terms the two
are simply locked by an interface—are interdependent in terms of probability value and mutually
enabling. That is, seeing things in terms of contradictions makes objectivity possible—or more
accurately, dissolves the hypostatization of subject and object, of cause and effect.
An example of mediated locking by asymmetric interfaces is historiography. It cannot in prin-
ciple engage a past that no longer exists and so refers to the relation of an emerging conception of
the past and its existing representation. What distinguishes it from fiction is the presence of the
asymmetric interfaces of evidence and socially constructed theory. Evidence refers to traces that
happen to persist worked up to suit historiographic production. Theory locks the discoveries of
past investigation on one hand and present individual thought on the other (see for an analogy,
Feyerabend 1966). In both cases the result is ideological (one-sided) because grounded by the
personality, interests and values of the historian who is a class member in contradictory society.
The utility of a historical conception is not whether it supports epistemic prediction or is truth-
ful in relation to an imagined past, but rather the extent to which it supports a representation of
the past that is grounded by the evidence, references a prevailing paradigm, is responsive to the
personal character of the investigator and at the same time is creative. Historical consciousness
thus enables creative action that is practical in the actual world.
Short-range history is well grounded by traces of the past, but its causal analysis is unresponsive
to a discovery of non-actual probabilities. Although it may be provocative to say, short-range
history therefore fails to support historical consciousness. It offers a particular person an identity
because of the person’s own connection with an immediate past that acquires meaning because
of its spatio-temporal proximity. Universal history on the other hand finds all pasts to be equally
instructive, however remote in time and place.
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4 The Radical Emergence of the Biological Domain
Although living organisms are physical, the biological domain introduces a radically new kind of
behavior, that of “life.” Albeit circular, argued will be that a living organism transcends the physical
domain because it constructs a historical ground that references existents but is a probability vector
does not reduce to them.
Defining life has not been easy (Cleland and Chyba 2002). Definitions are often a list of
functions associated with life such as metabolism, evolution and the reproduction of information.
Evolution does not seem relevant because organisms that are clearly alive may not evolve for
many millions of years. Also, evolution refers to populations, not to individual living organisms.
Reproduction and metabolism also fail to be definitive, for while they are certainly conditions
necessary for life they exist in the physical domain and can be replicated in the laboratory with
non-living hydrocarbon molecules (Luisi 2007).
4.1 Informed choices
An obvious distinction of life, as opposed to just a description of its functions or necessary con-
ditions, is that while in the physical domain dissipation—the path of least action—is probable,
in the biological domain the opposite is the case (Brillouin 1949). Being alive means perpetuat-
ing improbable action potentials by making choices that do not reduce to the determinations of
circumstance (Brembs 2011). So improbable choices seem a useful place to start.
A choice is a discrimination that transcends its objects and depends on an independent criterion
by which to reduce its objects to what is relevant to the criterion. Choices cannot be enabled by the
ground of an evolved genotype because what persists from the past does not convey such a criterion
(Singer 1996). What grounds life must be a structure that is constructed by action in the present.
In folk psychology this ground is intentionality. Not only does this impose a mind-body dualism,
but as will be illustrated shortly simple organisms lacking a central nervous system do in fact make
choices (Bitbol and Luisi 2004). Furthermore, neurology suggests that conscious intentions may
be more an effect of action than its cause (Libet 2002).
Choices sustain an organism’s improbable action potential. In the biological domain improb-
able action potentials are constructed by metabolism—a recursive set of chemical reactions that
yield complex organic molecules that support a reproduction of the improbable state of being alive.
However, metabolism in hypothetical isolation and thus grounded solely by existent molecules
would support only a regular emergence, the path of least action rather than choice. An emergence
that is radical in reference to the physical domain must be informed by a structure that does not
reduce to existing circumstances (Hochachka and McClelland 2014). In biochemistry, the lack
of such a ground would lead to a random chemistry or a combinatorial explosion inimical to life
(Pohorille 2009, 567). First to consider here is the historical ground that provides access to radical
action.
The motive of biological action is a “need”—the extent to which an organism’s action poten-
tial is insufficient to maintain its life. Improbable choices to meet needs must be balanced by the
dissipation of environmental improbabilities such as nutrients. These action potentials are discov-
ered by an organism taking action in its environment, and from that information is constructed a
grounding structure. But this in itself is insufficient; when you squeeze the rubber ball you have
little reason either to increase or reduce the pressure. Needed is historical information about how
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environmental action potentials have changed as the result of action. If they have declined, it rep-
resents a greater need that calls for an intensification of effort or a movement to where there is a
higher nutrient density.
This probability differential is a “historical ground,” not in the sense of an empirical difference
between states at two points in time, but a vector that indicates the direction and magnitude of
change in specific environmental probabilities that do not reduce to existents (Declerck 2012). It
is a discovery of a change in probability values rather than reduce the world one-sidedly to just
observable phenomena. If that value has declined, reproduction interprets it as a call for corrective
action such as modifying an organism’s interface with its environment.
An individual cell has an improbable state that depends on its separation from its environment
by a membrane interface, which is an asymmetric amphiphilic bilayer of complex molecules. Un-
like the physical domain, this interface is malleable in terms of its qualities and so is responsive
to choice. A cell regulates its relation with its environment either by altering the properties of its
membrane or by using it to move in the environment (Pohorille 2009). However, this still leaves
out how the mechanism of choice arose in the first place. This will be explained by viewing the
cell not as an isolate, but as a social being right from the start.
It should be noted that the rubber ball analogy fails at this point, for the most probable relation
of its molecules is the immediate lock of their self-grounds. This persistent lock was simply
outweighed by outside pressure. While some are inclined to posit this hysteresis as the key to
life, the rubber ball on its own cannot make choices and must always pursue the path of least
action. Thus a mere description of the emergence of living organisms from organic compounds
such as animo acids fails to explain how life radically broke from the physical domain and lacks
what Henri Bergson called an élan vital.
4.2 Social Being
How life arose in the first place will be adventurously attributed to “social being.” This concept is
not given an anthropological or sociological meaning nor even the conventional biological meaning
of the phenotypical effect of social interactions. Instead it refers here to a process that is grounded
by the difference of actual and non-actual probabilities. This will here be understood very broadly
as the discovery and actualization by the actual self of the radical improbabilities made accessible
by the grounding of another radically improbable structure.
Viewing life as a process rather than entity avoids the logical problem of suggesting life initially
arose from sociality and is thus social prior to the life of the individual living organism (Gilbert,
Sapp, and Tauber 2012). This problem arises because we generally view the earliest life forms,
single-celled archaea and bacteria (or the Lowest Common Ancestor), as isolates despite the fact
that the earliest evidence for them is of their association (Noffke et al. 2006).
An association of metabolism and reproduction can arise from a selective incorporation of
the artifacts of the living action of other organisms. For example, there can be a lateral transfer
of free floating RNA or genes (Sapp 2009; Beiko et al. 2005), particularly those related to the
metabolism’s construction of action potentials (Rivera et al. 1998). These molecules are not alive,
but rather are radically improbable artifacts of life. An appropriation of radically improbable value
constructed by others to ground the radical emergence of self may not be unexpected, but by
presuming life the question remains begged.
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More helpful in this respect is endosymbiosis (Nowack and Melkonian 2010). It is increasingly
felt that life started as an association of independent non-living organelles that gradually lost their
independence to give rise to life. Popular is Lynn Margulis’ serial endosymbiont hypothesis that
mitochondria, chloroplasts and other organelles originated as non-living isolates that a non-living
vesicle absorbed and upon which it came to depend for its improbable state (Sneed 2015).
Manfred Eigen and Peter Schuster (Eigen and Schuster 1979) explain this by arguing that life
started as a recursively organized hypercycle of reproductive and metabolic catalytic cycles in
which each cycle creates reactants for the other. In functional terms, action enabled by a metabolic
cycle discovers the degree that the reproductive cycle has been successful, and this informs choices.
No one cycle is in itself alive, but their organized association informed by historical information
does support life. Eigen and Schuster employed the model of Darwinian evolution to explain why
the hypercycle variant (“quasi-species”) most effective in maintaining an action potential tended
to prevail over other quasi-species and persist.
The E. coli bacterium will provide an example of two ways in which social being enables action
that is radically improbable in relation to the physical domain. They arise from different interfaces.
One interface is the cell wall. The other interface is constructed as the effect of a bacterium entering
a probable relation with other bacteria. Important is that the former is what enables the latter, for
the association of bacteria presumes they already have an action potential.
4.3 The case of E. coli
The E. coli bacterium is a single-celled organism enclosed in a selectively permeable membrane
vesicle. This interface lets ions and nutrients in, while toxins are expelled. However, as Maxwell’s
Daemon shows, the interface in itself is insufficient to support choices that transcend circumstance
(Brillouin 1951). Needed is a ground that is independent of existents.
E. coli discovers the probability density of nutrients in its environment by an improbable move-
ment within it that dissipates its own metabolic action potentials. This movement lasts for about a
second, and the result is a discovery of how nutrient probability density has as the result changed.
This information defines whether or not the reproduction of its improbable state stands in need. If
the probability density remains the same or has increased, a sensory receptor in the bacterium’s
membrane constructs a CheY molecule to signal its ion motors to spin flagella in a counterclock-
wise direction. This bundles them so that E. coli continues in its current path. However if nutrient
density instead decreases, a phosphate is added to the CheY molecule to make it a CheZ molecule
to represent a likely increased need. It signals the flagella to rotate instead in a clockwise direction,
which unbundles them so that the bacterium remains in place. Its orientation nevertheless changes
because of Brownian motion, and after a pause it explores the new direction (Berg 2006). Note
that the structure of the two molecules does not correspond with the empirical nature of the nutri-
ents engaged by E. coli’s sensory organelles, but are rather a function of their changing probability
values discovered through action.
Social action by E. coli’s organelles informed by historical information admittedly offers a
rather limited choice. On its own E. coli cannot decide where go because it lives in a one-
dimensional world, leaving it only the option to stop or go. However, another kind of radical
action becomes available because of its social action in the present. Bacteria tend to enter a proba-
ble relation and thus form a community structure—a biofilm or bacterial mat (Waters and Bassler
2005). This structure grounds movement in three dimensions—an action not accessible to indi-
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vidual bacteria. Because social existence is not reified to serve as a causal factor, but is a mutual
discovery of possibilities through joint action, social existence enhances rather than constrain in-
dividual capabilities (Jacob et al. 2004).
This implies that a transcendental social being and a radically improbable individual action
refer to the same process rather than to a mereological dichotomy of self and other. The action of
organelles within a particular cell and the social being of bacteria in a mat are both a discovery of
non-actual probabilities that are abstract in reference to existents. The social being of organelles,
individual organisms and even individuals from different species makes behaviors accessible that
are beyond the reach of the hypothetical isolate (Fredrickson 2015). This understanding depends
on the grounding of non-actual probabilities and so is not accessible to the method of reductive
abstraction. It can only be acquired through the method of constructive abstraction.
4.4 Personality and the self
It follows that the more improbable the outcome of social action the wider are the possibilities ac-
cessible for an organism’s improbable emergence. Social being enhances the individuated action
of crabs (Laidre 2010) and insects (Dussutour, Deneubourg, and Fourcassié 2005). Even plants can
recognize themselves and their kindred and choose whether or not to cooperate with them (Chen,
During, and Anten 2012; Biedrzyck et al. 2010). Because social being makes probabilities acces-
sible beyond those of self-grounding, organisms acquire personality in the sense of individuation.
This is not a random deviation, for the individuated action is functional.
The word personality conventionally refers to the effect of the mind’s unique development on
character and action. However, the ontic probability fundamentalism of this paper makes indi-
viduation, other than merely a random mutation or deviation amplification, what is enabled by
discovery through action. It is why personality in the sense of individuated action exists even in
single-celled organisms that lack a central nervous system (Boehm 2006). Personality should not
be thought of as peculiarly human, but instead as a radical artifact of biological social being.
Of course the eventual centralization of a nervous system supported a far greater development
of both kinds of radical action. For example, the distinction of a discovery of historical and social
information through action arguably gave rise to the functions of a working and a long-term mem-
ory (Shomrat et al. 2008). Working memory includes an executive function that focuses attention
by limiting sensory inputs to favor action that transcends them (D’Esposito et al. 1995). This rapid
and complex computation independent of current sensory information is similar to the function
of a computer’s RAM. Long term memory, like a computer’s hard disk, means an ability to rely
on an agent’s past experience. However, as Alan Turing pointed out, their union in a computer
does not support choices that transcend circumstance. He felt that doing so requires a supernatural
black-box able to transcend existents that he called an “oracle” (Soare 1996).
It is difficult to assess the presence of an episodic memory in animals in which the animal
remembers itself as an agent in relation to past circumstances. However, it is becoming clear
that many animals can recognize other individuals and themselves. Much of the work has been
done with primates, but it seems, for example, that pigeons recognize themselves as individuals
(Epstein, Lanza, and Skinner 1981) and arguably the gloomy octopus has an episodic memory
(Pronk, Wilson, and Harcourt 2010). This ability to represent in mind one’s own individuation
is known as “primary consciousness.” It is not yet the human self-consciousness that radically
emerged from this primary consciousness.
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5 The Biological Enabling of Species Being
The third domain that is radically improbable in reference to its parent domain(s) is that of human-
ity, here named the domain of “species being.” This term is a translation of Ludwig Feurerbach’s
Gattungswesen, which served to distinguish humans from other animals (Held 2009). Although
the trend today is to minimize this distinction, it will here play a central role. Rather than being a
quaint fossil, the term “species being” usefully points to the difference between being biologically
alive and being human.
The difference is taken to be species being’s ability to construct grounds for action that are
radically improbable not just in reference to its parent domains, but radically improbable even in
reference to its own domain. That is, the action of species being is not only physical in the sense
of being contradictory and biological in the sense of making choices that support the reproduction
of improbable life, but is to a degree is also sui generis. Argued will be that the ground for this
radically improbable action is the extent to which present action is improbable in reference to past
action.
While admittedly abstruse, this point nevertheless addresses a classic philosophical issue, which
is how to explain creativity or free will. The paper’s argument has been that the possibilities for
novel action become accessible because of an exogenous ground, and in the biological domain this
ground was an artifact of the discovery of changes in environmental probability values. In the case
of species being, the ground of action is radically improbable in reference to the radical action of
biological life.
Several things can be said right at the start about this new ground. To be radically improbable
in relation to life’s maintenance through a contradictory relation with nature, the ground of species
being must emerge from a contradiction that is independent of the production of life’s action po-
tentials. This contradiction can only be located in human society as a social contradiction. Of
course the radical emergence of species being must balance a dissipation of the action potentials
that arise from life’s contradictory relation with nature. Since these social action potentials depend
on production of improbable value, species being requires a dissipation of the natural environment
that is in addition to that needed for biological reproduction.
Addressed in this section is how in a probabilistic world biological evolution gave rise to rad-
ically improbable structures because what can happen eventually does happen if conditions allow.
In the next section is discussed how and why these structures began to ground behavior peculiar to
species being not accidentally but regularly. When this behavior becomes probable rather than ac-
cidental, it marks the beginning of the Archaic Socio-Economic Formation—species being’s initial
stage of development.
5.1 The development of hominin action potentials
There is little doubt that increasing action potentials (a deepening contradictory relation with the
natural environment) was a hominin evolutionary trend well before the appearance of any distinc-
tive human behavior inaccessible to other animals. There have been various theories to account for
it. For a long time a biological reductionism attributed it to the evolution of a remarkably endowed
species, that of Homo sapiens. Today this is no longer persuasive because not only do other species
such as H. erectus and H. neandertalensis exhibit human-like behaviors (for example, Wade 2016),
but there may be hints of it even earlier with the Australopicene genus (Ambrose 2001). In any
case, biological evolution is only an enabling condition, not an actualization of species being.
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Popular is the peculiarly Western belief that humans are distinguished by a flexible opportunism
made possible by the evolution of tools through cultural accumulation. However, it was argued here
that rational choice is definitive of life and is not peculiarly human. A variety of animals have a
culture that conveys the use of perhaps even compound tools (Hunt and Gray 2004). New Cali-
donian crows apparently enjoy a ratcheting tool culture (Holzhaider, Hunt, and Gray 2010). An
example of this belief is the invention of a “neolithic revolution” by which the economic accumu-
lation facilitated by agriculture made humans masters of their destiny. However, simple organisms
such as ants growing fungus as their food by feeding it grass clippings (Benckiser 2010) can be
skillful cultivators. While tool development does deepen the contradictory metabolic relation of an
organism and its environment, it is not peculiarly human.
Others prefer to focus on cognitive ability, but in recent years it is less clear that humans are
fundamentally different in terms of it (in general see Shettleworth 2009). As impressive as are
Homo’s cognitive skills, they are merely a quantitative development of behaviors already manifest
in animals. Examples of remarkable animal intelligence abound (such as described by Emery and
Clayton 2004 in a descendant of dinosaurs, by Zimmer 2008 in a mollusk and by Alem et al.
2016 in an insect). These include an ability to abstract, to manipulate symbols (if encouraged),
to recognize the self and to plan. Popular recently is the idea that theory of mind (awareness of
another’s mental state) is peculiarly human, but it seems that great apes are capable of it (Krupenye
et al. 2016). Cognitive skill is not peculiar to humans, and it has even been argued that with the
development of species being cranial capacity actually shrank a bit, for genetically based cleverness
was no longer quite so necessary (Bednarik 2014).
5.2 The primary contradiction
Emergent hominin action potentials draw attention to the contradictory relation with the environ-
ment. But what comes to distinguish humans from other hominins is that their action potential be-
comes partially unhinged from that contradiction. This is thanks to a socially constructed interface
that supports another contradiction. Given these two contradictions, the biological contradiction
in the case of species being will henceforth be named the “primary contradiction” because it is
the source of action potentials on which depends a secondary “social contradiction” that separates
action potentials from the primary contradiction thanks to its interface.
Important is not merely the existence of these two contradictions, but their existential interde-
pendence. This is not just because the dissipative side of the social contradiction is the emergent
side of the primary contradiction, leaving nature to take the brunt. The point is that to a degree,
each contradiction is constructed by the other.
More specifically the primary contradiction is not simply a continuation of biological metabol-
ism. The difference is usually indicated by calling the primary contradiction “economic produc-
tion.” However, the term will be avoided here because it implies a one-sided reification that disre-
gards its essential dependence on the social contradiction. Argued is that the agent in the primary
contradiction is the species being constructed by the social contradiction rather than simply a bi-
ological social being. However generic, the term primary contradiction will be used in lieu of
economic production or metabolism to emphasize its dependence on the secondary contradiction.
The outcome of the primary contradiction is an improbable product, the dissipation of which
supports human emergence. Thus of concern here is not its empirical specificity, but the improb-
ability of its value. The word “value” has contradictory meanings in economics. In bourgeois
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economics value is the costs of production of a commodity with which it can be exchanged in
the marketplace; in working-class economics it includes an emergent value created by labor in
addition to the costs of production. In the biological domain, the improbable value arising from
metabolism is an action potential that supports the improbable reproduction of life. Therefore what
emerges from the primary contradiction if taken in hypothetical isolation are “use values;” they are
useful in reference to life’s reproduction and meeting existing needs. The next section will address
needs resulting from the social contradiction in the domain of species being. They are radically
improbable in reference to the primary contradiction and will be distinguished as “wants.” Despite
the word’s connotation, wants will not be understood to be whimsical desires but as necessarily
met to support our humanity, our species being.
The interface of the primary contradiction is conventionally referred to as the “means of pro-
duction” (Bottomore 1991, 204-206). They include emergent physical structures such as tools, raw
materials and productive facilities, and emergent social capabilities that are ideational (science and
technology) and biological (the condition and availability of people for work). What distinguishes
it from a metabolic interface is that it supports not only the emergence of use values, but also a
surplus value actualized for the satisfaction of wants—today generally privately appropriated as
profit. The aspect of the means of production that supports the satisfaction of wants is a “labor
power” peculiar to species being.
The concept of labor power is not well defined in the literature. Here it is seen as the effect
of the degree to which the producer of value has acquired species being and is thus able to create
value radically independent of use value. A hypothetical fully automatic machine can produce use
values to satisfy all existing needs, but without the input of species being it cannot satisfy wants.
In the biological domain there are times when the production of use value is inadequate to
meet needs and times when it is more than what is needed. Ceteris paribus excess value lacks
use; your Zen cat leaves its prey at the door. In the case of species being, however, some value is
“appropriated.” Value can be appropriated as use value to reproduce the conditions of production,
but also an additional value actualized to meet socially constructed wants. It is a “surplus value”
(Bottomore 1991, 529-531), not because it is more than what is needed for reproduction, but
because its actualization basically addresses wants having little to do with the production of use
values. It seems the size of surplus value relative to use value has increased in the course of human
history.
Given these distinctions, which admittedly are not entirely conventional, one would expect
evidence for the emergence of species being to be the actualization of surplus value to meet wants.
Although this evidence is intermittent and contentious (Hovers and Belfer-Cohen 2006), it is clear
that hominins such as perhaps H. erectus and definitely H. sapiens and H. neandertalensis were
beginning to address wants.
5.3 The peculiarity of species being
The object is to identify action that is independent of biological social reproduction. Humans
construct a social contradiction that gives rise to a ground radically independent of the primary
interface and supports action that goes beyond addressing use values. It was manifest in Africa by
140 ka and perhaps even before then. This behavior is often quaintly referred to as “modern” but
the term is avoided here because it implies a reified empirical coherence (as in Nowell 2010) con-
structed by a reductive abstraction. On the contrary, all Archaic trajectories appear to be complex
and empirically unique (for examples see Ames 2004 and Fuller 2006).
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It is useful to provide some examples of behaviors that have little to do with biological re-
production. One such behavior is ritual. While rituals exist in the biological domain, in that of
species being they can be independent of the primary contradiction. For example, ecstatic rituals
are inferred from art works in which the self-reproducing social being is transcended to acquire a
state of mind radically independent of the self. Music had perhaps a similar function.
It is clear that ritual feasting was a common practice (Arnold 1996) and could promote social
solidarities unrelated to reproduction (Grimstead and Bayham 2010). Gift exchange or potlatch
also cemented social relations and included those transcending local production (Tollefson 1995).
Exchange networks exist in the biological world (for example, Simard et al. 2015), but in the
domain of species being they could be unhinged from the production of use value. Another ex-
ample was regional cult centers that supported a cooperation on basis far wider than just units of
biological reproduction.
Another example of where human ritual is distinct from biological ritual is burials (Munro and
Grosman 2010) and the provision of grave goods. They attribute to the individual a value that
does not reduce to biology, for a dead organism cannot reproduce or provide use value. One can
speculate that ritual burials took place because, to take liberties with John Donne, the death of
another species being reduces the ground of one’s own humanity.
Monuments ground consciousness with what no longer exists in the present. Other than an
occasional time-keeping astronomical function they seem unrelated to production of use values.
They appear among Pleistocene hunter-gatherers (Curry 2008) and by the Holocene are common.
Of course there are monumental constructs in the animal world such as termite mounds, but they
ultimately serve reproduction and are monumental in size, not monuments that bring something to
mind that transcends sensory information about existents.
Language is frequently viewed as a force that liberates the person from circumstance because
recursion makes it open ended. However, a recursive process, like chaos, is simply a determi-
nate dynamical system having initial conditions too complex or subtle to support prediction; it
is only epistemically open ended. Rather, language seems merely a biological precondition for
species being. Also it is not certain that human language is distinguished by recursion (Gentner
et al. 2006; Everett 2009). The kind of openness that enables species being is not epistemic unpre-
dictability, but radical grounds that are artifacts of species being and independent of the production
of use values.
5.4 A liberating historical consciousness
So the object is to explain how behavior that is radically improbable in relation to social reproduc-
tion and the production of use values could become grounded and thus accessible in the biological
domain prior to its probable actualization as the domain of species being. While the argument par-
allels life’s use of historical information to inform choices that transcend existents, it is suggested
that species being employs a different kind of historical information.
A biological organism maintains an action potential that is radically improbable in reference
to the physical domain by means of action that discovers a historical change in circumstantial
probabilities. It is suggested that in contrast the historical ground of action peculiar to species being
is based not on changes in circumstantial probability values but on changes in the improbability of
action itself. The question is how such radical action was initiated.
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While animals are undoubtedly aware of the effort of their actions, that information only sup-
ports taking the path of least work needed to sustain life. Humans on the other hand transcend
the production of just use values and a reproduction of phenotypical “human nature.” These are
merely conditions of species being. Unlike biological organisms, humans embrace the added ef-
fort to do what is radically improbable in order to meet wants and thus develop their humanity as
transcendental agents.
This was traditionally explained in the West as an appropriation of divine creativity by a human
nature made in god’s image, a supernatural demi-urgos or a Prometheus. This mysticism survives
today as an assumption that action is driven by an idea, value or goal rather than cognition being
grounded in action. Some argue that creative behavior is simply the result of biological evolution:
for example the development of a dopamine reward for creative action (Chermahini and Hommel
2010) and an oxytocin reward for pro-social behavior (Zak, Stanton, and Ahmadi 2007). However,
this begs the question of why the rewards evolved in the first place. It might also seem reasonable to
argue that technical innovation was self-perpetuating because it either reduced effort or increased
the utility of the product. However, there is a profound difference between the regular emergence
of technology in the biological domain and the radical emergence of species being.
The production of use values is regularly improbable in reference to action in the past and
generates new needs because action potentials must balance a dissipation of environmental action
potentials that are finite. While a variety of tactics can slow the emergence of needs, it is an
unavoidable effect of being alive. On the other hand, action that is radically improbable in reference
to action in the past not only deepens the primary contradiction but of itself generates new wants.
This is because the action of species being is radically transcendent and generates new wants for
that reason. The generation and satisfaction of radically emergent wants is what makes us human
and is the source of human dignity.
Because action in the biological domain is primarily in thrall to the production of use val-
ues, any actualization of probabilities that are radically improbable in reference to biological need
would initially have been accidental. This seems to explain why evidence for behavior peculiar
to species being was at first so intermittent (Hovers and Belfer-Cohen 2006) rather than arise
gradually from a cultural or genetic evolution. Radically improbable behavior accessible in the
biological domain would have been of no consequence until it became probable, until its benefit
was so widely recognized that an interface was constructed to institutionalize it.
6 The Initial Stage of Species Being
The consensus is that virtually everyone in the Archaic Socio-Economic Formation (as prehistory
is here named) was either a producer of value (action potentials) or primarily lent support to its
production. That is, virtually everyone is immediately locked by the primary contradiction’s in-
terface. This interface is asymmetric and is also immediately locked with the environment. In
hypothetical isolation this arrangement would simply be biological metabolism, the construction
of action potentials to reproduce improbable life. The mediated lock of producers and environment
means that to live well you best use conventional means to do it.
But the method of constructive abstraction does not represent Archaic economic production as
isolated. It was wedded to a social contradiction that constructed a ground for action radically inde-
pendent of biological reproduction and the production of use values. Production by species being
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depended on the social contradiction for labor power just as the social contradiction depended on
the primary contradiction for surplus value. While the emergence of the radical ground of species
being has ultimately to balance environmental dissipation, as an artifact of a social contradiction it
is empirically independent of production.
6.1 The appropriation of surplus value
It is agreed today that in the Archaic Socio-Economic Formation a ruling class was either lacking
or at best only incipient. So it will now be adventurously argued that a radically improbable ground
arose from a social contradiction located instead in the mind, between a producer’s social being
and the producer’s species being. The question is how in the absence of an actual ruling class
surplus value could be appropriated to address wants at the expense of producers’ need to live.
Some examples of this difficulty are worth mentioning.
It is frequently argued that, analogous to biological selection operating on the epistemically
random mutation of genes, a deviation amplification in individual power, status and wealth in an
originally “pristine” society evolved into social classes and eventually ancient states. However,
it is doubtful this Darwinian model can be applied to social phenomena (Sperber and Claidière
2006). Also, ethology shows that inequality is common in the animal world, particularly among
primates. Pristine equality turns out to be little more than Enlightenment ideology, for inequalities
can characterize human hunter-gatherers (Killion 2013) and appear even among kindred (Testart
1989). Rather than being pristine and indicative of “human nature,” social equality appears to have
been constructed for reason (Runciman 2005).
Furthermore, an assumption that individual advantage is the engine of history and the reason
for social relations being competitive also seems an artifact of Enlightenment ideology. The self-
contained individual is a construct peculiar to the modern West (Morris 1994). The resulting
methodological individualism means that social relations offer nothing to the sacrosanct self but
an opportunity to promote its own private advantage at the expense of others. In contrast, it is here
argued that the dignity of being human is not won through the exploitation of others but becomes
accessible through a joint struggle with others, a mutual discovery of species being (as in marriage
and the labor union) or through access to public surplus value (as in public education). While the
work to actualize this accessible species being depends ultimately on our contradictory relation
with nature, it is immediately the work enabled by the social contradiction, or put more simply that
of class struggle.
Some argue that the evolution of culture can ground radically improbable action (see Fracchia
and Lewontin 1999 for a critique). To get around the problem that a regular emergence fails to
offer a radical ground, it has been suggested that culture ratchets (Tennie, Call, and Tomasello
2009) and thereby breaks with its past. The difficulty is that ratcheting presumes a reification
of socio-cultural totalities, when in fact every individual continually and selectively adopts and
modifies the portions of culture to which that person happens to be exposed.
Artifacts of species being ground the emergence of species being because of their radical im-
probability in reference to existent actualities rather than because of their qualities. This artifactual
grounding has reached an apogee today as technology brings people together at the global level
despite their empirical differences (Aneesh 2015). In the Archaic stage it seems that exchanges be-
tween individuals at temporary aggregation sites became more extensive prior to the Holocene. Put
broadly, species being was facilitated by larger social units with a more intensive social interaction,
as seems to have been the case in joint child rearing.
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However, mutual grounding presumes that people are radically innovative to begin with, and
so the underlying mechanism for it must be found. Anthropologists often look to a self-interested
social agent to appropriate and actualize surplus value. While there were advantaged individuals in
the Archaic Formation, they lacked a mechanism or motivation for such an appropriation (people
could always vote with their feet to avoid it). So a mechanism of appropriation that does not depend
on actual social classes is now be proposed.
6.2 A cognitive social contradiction
In the biological domain a failure to predict brings surprise and disappointment but not a belief
that the world is inherently unpredictable. However with the development of hominin action po-
tentials and as circumstances were increasingly of human construction, a failure to predict must
have seemed unnatural. It is suggested that the result in folk psychology is a reification of super-
natural forces or thaumaturges that stand outside a world that biological existence required to be
predictable in principle.
It is further suggested that such a supernatural agent is a real cognitive entity that grounds a
cognitive probability distribution to make radically improbable actions accessible in thought. This
does not lend respectability to Descartes, for it is not suggested that the idea does work. The coun-
terfactual cognitive entity merely grounds a cognitive probability distribution to make radically
improbable actions accessible. Their actualization, however, is the result of work—a dissipation
of nature’s action potentials through the primary contradiction. So a social contradiction in the
form of a consciousness that grounds value arising from the primary contradiction on one hand
and supernatural cognitive entities on the other can inform action that is radically improbable in
reference to biological reproduction.
These radically improbable cognitive entities constitute the “ruling class” in the Archaic For-
mation because in practice there seems to have been an array of supernatural forces or urgoi. They
ruled in the sense that the appropriation of a surplus to satisfy wants was at the expense of the bi-
ological drive for social reproduction. While this argument may accord with how we know people
act, it remains speculative and is certainly at odds with convention. However, the purpose has been
to demonstrate that the method of constructive abstraction can provide a naturalistic explanation
of species being that is beyond the reach of a reductive abstraction.
For there to be an Archaic Formation, action radically independent of existents had to be-
come probable rather than just accidental. The supernatural had to become an institutionalized
cultural belief that provided a regular interface between economic value and a supernatural world
of the imagination. The supernatural could not exist without the dissipation of surplus value; sur-
plus value could not exist without its supernatural appropriation. The two contradictions mutually
deepen because they are both locked with the producing class.
Sociology refers to the interface of the social contradiction as “superstructure” (Bottomore
1991, 45-48), which today refers specifically to ideology and state. But the Archaic Formation
lacked a state institution and, without written documents, ideology (cognitive entities that are func-
tional in reference to the social contradiction) is difficult to infer.
An example of what can be inferred is a culture of sacrifices and ritual that left behind physical
traces. These institutions encouraged a voluntary self-appropriation in the sense that the producer is
willing to limit the satisfaction of needs so that there is a surplus value to meet wants. Shamanism,
for example, mediated the lock between the supernatural and the producers of use value.
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Not dependent on the institutions that mediate the social contradiction is a mutual grounding
of species beings through joint struggle, as in production. Through it is discovered the other
person’s species being, the representation of which can ground species being’s becoming accessible
to the self. Arguably this is the basis for the “dignity” of labor. In a successful marriage, as the
partners struggle together to establish a transcendent unity, they become ever more fully human.
The person’s dignity is the radically improbable outcome of their labor that enables one’s own
emergence as species being. Because this emergence addresses human wants, it is a motivation.
The argument has assumed that the Archaic producer was to some extent a species being.
This runs counter to the late 19th century view that the producer is just another inert force of
production unable to be creative (as illustrated by Millet’s Man with a Hoe [1898]). While the
Archaic producer’s development as species being naturally lagged that of the ideal appropriating
agent, the point is that, however modest, its possession by the producer was a real condition of
surplus value. If productivity eventually reaches the point that the production of use values is
fully mechanized and automated, the producer can ground production solely for the satisfaction of
his or her wants as species being. At this point the need for superstructure to support the radical
emergence of species being ends and is replaced by real democracy in which the development of
society and the individual are one.
6.3 The Archaic Socio-Economic Formation
The initial stage in the emergence of species being has here been called the Archaic Socio-Economic
Formation, although it is more conventionally known as either the primitive-communal stage (for
example, in Momjan 1980, 45-50) or as “prehistory.” The term prehistory is avoided because it
implies a passive adaptation of a fixed human nature to changing circumstances; it fails to represent
humans as constructing themselves as species beings by actualizing probabilities made accessible
by a socially constructed ground independent of the production of use value. The term primitive-
communal is not used because it seems the Archaic Socio-Economic Formation was neither egali-
tarian nor lacking in individuation.
To suggest that human history has been a progressive actualization of species being accords,
except for the terminology, with convention. Some even argue that this development has given rise
to an entirely new geologic era, the anthropocene, although this point seems rather empty outside
the discipline of geology. Because until now the satisfaction of wants has been at the expense of
needs, the paper argued that the mechanism for the emergence of species being was necessarily a
social contradiction. As the result, what marks stages in history are the persistent superstructures
that enable social contradictions. For example, the social contradiction of the Archaic Socio-
Economic Formation was arguably in the mind and transmitted by culture, while in subsequent
social formations it involved the contradictory relation of actual social classes.
The meaning of “social class” here is not that of folk science, for it is not a reification of a
set of persistent shared properties such as income level, nor are class relations viewed in terms of
inequities. Such a definition can support the maintenance of social order, but it blocks explanation
and thus social change. Classes are here defined instead in terms of their relation to the surplus
value that supports the emergence of species being. The members of a class either create surplus
value as the producing class or appropriate it as the ruling class. However, these simple functional
terms only serve to elucidate the method of constructive abstraction. In fact at every stage in
history the grounding of circumstance makes classes empirically complex, even ambivalent, and
they acquire names reflecting those conditions.
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If human history is understood as our mounting ability to transcend circumstance to acquire
species being, then of fundamental concern must be the grounds that make radical action accessi-
ble. This is why social classes represent “relations of production” (Edwards 1978): superstructure
locks the producing class with the production of value and locks the ruling class with its appro-
priation (Abercrombie, Hill, and Turner 1988, 35-38). The aim of the argument has been the
modest one of merely identifying the mechanism of social change, not the more challenging one
of historiography, which brings together theory, rhetorical skill and empirical research.
It is not denied that social inequities can be source of contention, but addressing them only
deepens contradictions. It does not introduce new relations of production and thus new possibili-
ties for the development of species being. That is, protests or “bread and butter” struggles within
a given set of productive relations might develop conditions favorable to revolution, but are not
themselves revolutionary. Only class struggle in terms defined by the interface of the social con-
tradiction can do that. This can take many forms. For example, a demand for dignity inherently
challenges existing relations of production predicated on the appropriation of surplus value and
thus a constraint on most people’s species being.
6.4 Revolutions as the joints of universal history
In the West, historical subdivisions are reified cognitive constructs. Examples are a technological
reductionism (as in the Paleolithic, Bronze and Information Ages), a reification of cultural totalities
(as in civilization and Classical Antiquity) or an interaction of objectively ideal causal factors (as
in modes of production or world systems). This idealism withers under the glare of empirical
investigation (for example, Sassaman 2004). Many in the 20th century have as the result despaired
finding any scientifically warranted explanation of historical development and so retreat to the
simple narrative and short-range causal explanation of folk science. Any history beyond that of
individual private experience thereby loses shape or meaning and with it any hope that human
self-transcendence is subject to an explanation that can inform a struggle for liberation.
It used to be conventional in universal history to find the course of human history analogous
to biological evolution, with its speciation (types of society), vigorous youth, sclerotic advanced
age and final death (fall)—often followed by a gratuitous new type of society. Today a histori-
ography in the manner of Oswald Spengler or Arnold Toynbee has been largely abandoned as
unscientific. Yet it does roughly describe commonly observed trajectories. There do seem to be
distinctive social orders; their development does not seem random; they eventually collapse and
are usually succeeded by a society that is less probable, such as being larger, more economically
productive, more complex or more sophisticated. Just because explanations for this pattern have
proven inadequate does not mean it does not exist or its explanation should not be ventured.
If human history is understood to be the emergence of species being, then historical divisions
are best distinguished by their characteristic relations of production—the mechanism of that emer-
gence. In order to function, interfaces must conserve their value despite empirical change, and
so a revolutionary construction of new relations of production is eventually needed to ensure a
continued satisfaction of wants and development of species being.
This gives history a stadial character, with each stage initiated by a revolution that opens new
possibilities. Revolutions are the joints that lend shape to universal history, for they distinguish the
periods of slow evolution enabled by the relations of production constructed by the prior revolution.
The “evolution” of a particular stage is the mutual deepening of its primary and the social contra-
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dictions, which simultaneously gives rise to the action potentials that eventually make revolution
possible and to the unmet needs and wants that make it necessary. This interdependence of the
primary and social contradictions is why historical stages are called “socio-economic formations”
(Semyenov 1980; Munshi 1991). The result is a “progressive” sequence of stages defined as an
incremental actualization of species being. Technological progress is merely a necessary condition
for rather than a definition of progress. Progress is always a struggle to actualize probabilities to
satisfy wants peculiar to time, place and circumstance.
What is missing so far is a time dimension. The primary and social interfaces tend to persist,
not only because an interface’s self-ground is necessary for it to support a contradiction, but also
because they are grounded by the outcome of the actions they make probable. This supports
homeostasis and locks action potentials with old needs and wants. This dead hand of the past
slows the pace of change, but of greater significance is that the depth of the contradiction provides
a historical stage with a temporal dimension in relation to which particular events or entities acquire
an objective long-term significance: their impact on the depth of contradictions, their contribution
to the conditions for revolution and thus a further emergence of species being.
Note that the objective and subjective aspects of revolution here come together, for there is
nothing automatic about revolution. Motivation is always required to actualize accessible prob-
abilities. While revolution is objectively enabled and motivated by deepening contradictions, its
actualization is the result of informed choice and joint struggle. The outcome of class struggle is
revolution—the construction of new relations of production. The form this struggle takes, such as
whether it is at the state level or the degree it is rapid or violent, is a function of circumstance.
For example, historical circumstances brought together a relatively weak superstructure and
relatively great action potentials in 7th-century Europe. Mayors of the palace had the power to
appropriate surplus value privately rather can be held back by the grounding of Ancient super-
structure. This offered an exemplar for class struggle to complete the feudal revolution by the
10th century as large numbers of milites and castelains rising from the producing class formed a
large self-sufficient feudal ruling class. They used violent means to appropriate political (largely
ecclesiastical) land and subject it to their private surplus appropriation.
Revolution makes the sequence of stages progressive, although this is no longer a fashionable
belief. Besides the disheartening wars of 20th-century capitalism, another reason for pessimism
is that the usual measure of progress is subjective. There is no universal criterion for it that suits
everyone and all aspects of life. Here instead the criterion is the relative improbability of action
potentials (whether employed for good or for ill) and the improbability of species being. This
criterion is universal, for it is a probability that does not reduce to empirical specifics. In folk
terms, an improbable action in the future that transcends the present is enabled and necessitated by
the deepening of contradictions inherited from the past.
The aim here has not been to write a history of the Archaic Formation but merely to elaborate
the method sufficient to do it. In historical terms some Archaic producers acquired greater action
potentials than others. This was of no consequence until this elite modifies institutions in a way
to address political needs through the appropriation of a surplus value from producers. Because
this process is simultaneously objective and subjective, it avoids the old anthropological question
of whether a transition to the Ancient Socio-Economic Formation was a way to address emerging
political needs or was imposed by ambitious potentates.
An example of a historical approach to the revolutionary transition to the Ancient Social For-
mation might be the subjection of the supernatural to the private control of an elite (Marcus and
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Flannery 2004) or king. Ethnography suggests this brings with it police powers (Shariff, Noren-
zayan, and Henrich 2010), a surplus appropriation by an actual social agent standing outside pro-
duction (Peoples and Marlowe 2012) and the legitimation of that appropriation because it brought
a public service that reduced uncertainty (for example, Flad 2008). However, the interesting his-
toriographic question of the transition from the Archaic to the Ancient, then Feudal and finally
Capitalist Socio-Economic Formations lies outside the scope of this paper, concerned as it is with
the method suited to universal history.
7 Conclusion
This paper attempted to recover the function of universal history that placed what is particular in
relation to what is universal. However, it aimed to provide it with a method more robust and with
a historical consciousness more assuredly liberating. This required a reconstruction of universal
history in scientific rather than idealist terms. Proposed was the employment of the method of
constructive abstraction rather than rely on that of a reductive abstraction, which appeals to an
objective idealism to lend meaning to particulars.
Argued was that a scientific and materialist understanding of processes requires an expansion
of the definition of matter to include unobservable ontic probabilities. To recover history as a
process, and as one in which the individual species being is central, the paper appealed to a current
and open notion of scientificity rather than to a positivist science. The tangible, observable, identity
of actualities simply refers those ontic probabilities that happen to be maximally probable under
the circumstances.
The method is universal in the sense that it ventures to explain any kind of process, be it
physical, biological or human. While the scope that results makes a general conclusion difficult,
the conclusion does offer an opportunity to elaborate certain of the paper’s implications.
The old tension between the scientific and humanistic approaches to historiography seems a
percipitate of a one-sided conception that views history as a systemic interaction of reified concep-
tions or factors inferred from phenomena rather than from discovery through action. Lost thereby
is history as a process rather than a collection of effects; lost is empirical data that do not happen
to support an ideal coherence or have immediate causal efficacy.
Also lost is that it is individual species beings that make history, although not just as they please.
History is not made by reified cognitive entities such forces, laws, cultures, social groups or even
individuals in isolation. The union of a discovery of social possibilities through joint struggle and
the discovery of natural possibilities through production enables species being to transcend the
dead hand of the past if contradictions are sufficiently deep and there is an informed effort. By
representing human nature as a probability distribution, action is at once a social construct and true
to the self. There is no contradiction of self and other.
Unlike Western humanism, which reduces the world to its meaning for the potent individual,
the scientificity of this paper keeps humanity in communication with its physical and biological
being. This is viewed as desirable these days as we seek to recover a workable relation with
our environment and avoid ecological disaster. On the other hand, the paper’s posthumanism
underwrites freedom of choice and moral responsibility because action is grounded by both the
emergent self and by circumstances that make possibilities accessible.
Implicit in the paper is that an understanding of historically situated species being begins with
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the observation of symptoms that mark the depth of contradictions in a particular time and place.
The greater is this depth, the greater are both the action potentials and the unmet needs or wants
relative to the past. It lends observables significance in relation to the development of species
being, both in its evolution at a particular stage and for enabling the long-range revolutionary
potential for bringing the development of species being to a higher level. As the result, long- and
short-range history are reconciled.
Empirical facts have been called the alpha and omega of historiography. However, reducing
explanation to them is one sided. The shorter the range of an historical account, the more do
generalizations correspond with empirical specifics and lend warrant to narrative causal explana-
tion. However, it is unrealistic to attempt long range historiography in such terms, marked as it
is by overwhelming empirical diversity and profound change in time. In the absence of informa-
tion acquired through action, explanation beyond the parochial looses warrant. The aim was not
to discredit short range narrative, but to suggest that all historical study is both closed and open,
situated between the short- and the long-range. Universal history depends on short range analysis
to engage the ground of actualities and short-range history depends on universal history to engage
the possibilities for change. Each depends on the other.
One reaction to positivism has been postmodernism’s dismissal of science altogether as a meta-
narrative. Yet because action in the world is the source of action potentials and science is a knowl-
edge based on that action, the language of science is the only universal language. It offers the only
basis for global communication and must be the language of a universal history. However, the pa-
per began with an example of how the language of science is ideological. This is not inconsistent,
for science is a cognitive artifact of action. While action is universal in that it engages matter in all
its forms, the cognitive processing of that information is grounded by self and so in a contradictory
society is inherently ideological. Rather than being false, it is one-sided under that circumstance.
A Buddhist would understand that because action is particular, humanity’s relation with the
world is contradictory. So it might seem the paper’s argument implies that technological advances
can only delay inevitable environmental catastrophe (as Sebastiano Timpanaro has argued). The
necessarily ever greater improbability of human action is purchased by an ever greater dissipa-
tion of the environment on which that action depends. However, with the full actualization of
species being, action becomes universal in that physical, biological and human existence become
aspects of one process; environment and humankind then cease to stand in a contradictory relation.
Without superstructure anything possible under the circumstances becomes accessible, such as the
development of an effectively unlimited power source and a dispersion of heat away from the earth.
It was once thought that historical consciousness was liberating because it conveyed ideal pos-
sibilities. For example, prodigiously expensive historiographic infrastructures were constructed
in the 19th century Europe such as the Monumenta Germaniae Historica in the belief that human
development depended on the state’s actualization of ideal possibilities that can ground individual
Bildung or liberty. As the state became increasingly problematic in the 20th century (Auschwitz
and Hiroshima come to mind), an alternative explanation of development came from Darwinian
models of social evolution, which seemed to lend support to a dialectic of preservation of the
past and a competitive struggle for progress in the present. This model faltered under a siege of
criticism, and nothing has replaced it.
While there are a few historians who still believe that political history has a civilizing effect
or that radically transcendent powers can emerge from biological evolution, historiography has
generally lost its social utility. It provides ideological support for the present order as a necessary
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outcome of objective factors that leaves the individual little efficacy. This is perhaps an overly
dismal assessment, but little remains today of any serious justification for historical consciousness
as needed for human liberty. The paper attempted to recover it through a scientific understanding
of how historic processes actually work.
The method of constructive abstraction engages the conditions necessary for human dignity
and the mechanism by which it is constructed. This is not a cosmopolitanism in which people’s
empirical differences somehow become appealing if kept at a safe distance, nor is it a humanism in
which the world reduces to the ego of the powerful. Rather, the argument was that the actualization
of human dignity depends on the mutual grounding of maximally individuated species beings, their
gaining access to surplus value and the struggle to actualize them .
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